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PREFACE: 1999 WORK-FOR-HIRE AMENDMENT ELIMINATES
IMPORTANT TERMINATION RIGHTS FOR ARTISTS
The legal issue that is the subject of this Note was once nothing
more than a curious topic of debate among attorneys who represent
recording artists. When I began researching the topic in June of 1998,
several artists' attorneys explained the problems with language cus-
tomarily inserted in record contracts by record companies claiming
that the artists' sound recordings are "work made for hire." Most
artists' attorneys have always disagreed with this work-for-hire lan-
guage, believing it to be a misguided interpretation of the law, but
they have always known that the contractual language could not
legally bind their clients." Instead, the issue of whether a sound
recording is a work-for-hire has been considered a question of statu-
tory interpretation that courts would one day decide in favor of art-
ists.'
Until November 29, 1999, artists' attorneys had rested on the
assumption that the issue whether sound recordings are works-for-
hire would be decided by courts around year 2013. Beginning in that
year, the so-called "right of termination" would have entitled artists to
*1. As explained in Part I, infra, "work-for-hire clauses have no effect regarding whether
the objective work-for-hire requirements are met; courts instead look to the actual relationship
between the parties."
*2. The 92d Congress in 1971 expressly deferred to the parties involved (and ultimately the
courts) on the question ofwhether sound recordings would be works-for-hire. See H.R. REP. No.
92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1570 ('The bill does not fix the authorship,
or the resulting ownership, of sound recordings, but leaves these matters to the employment
relationship and bargaining among the interests involved.!).
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reclaim their copyrights after proving that their sound recordings are
not works-for-hire under the 1976 Copyright Act.3 Congress, however,
eliminated artists' termination rights with a recent Copyright Act
amendment expanding the definition of "work made for hire" to in-
clude sound recordings.'4 The artists' rights to reclaim valuable
streams of royalty revenue generated by their sound recordings was
the result of years of negotiations between private interests, a number
of Copyright Office studies, and careful consideration by the 94th
Congress in 1976;" Congress eliminated these rights with the stroke of
a pen in 1999.
If Congress had not suddenly intervened, courts would have
found that artists' sound recordings are not works-for-hire in accor-
dance with equitable principles,' legal precedent,' and congressional
policy underlying the 1976 Copyright Act.'8 A United States District
Court recently reached this conclusion. On March 5, 1999, the court
in Ballas v. Tedesco held that "sound recordings are not a work-for-
hire under the second part of the statute because they do not fit within
any of the nine enumerated categories."" Unfortunately, Congress
passed the 1999 amendment without considering equitable principles,
legal precedent, or the uniquely intricate compromise underlying the
1976 legislation.
The work-for-hire amendment passed without hearings or de-
bate" on November 29, 1999, the last day Congress was in session, in
*3. As explained in Part I, infra, "works-for-hire are not subject to this right of termina-
tion .... Unfettered by the right of termination, a record company's ownership of a work-for-hire
copyright endures for the life of the copyright, which is sixty to eighty-five years longer than the
company's ownership of a copyright terminated thirty-five years after assigment."
*4. This amendment, hereinafter called the "work-for-hire amendment," reads in its en-
tirety: "WORK MADE FOR HIRE - Section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended in
the definition relating to work for hire in paragraph (2) by inserting 'as a sound recording,' after
'audiovisual work.' " Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999,
S.1948, tit. I, sec. 1101(d) (1999), incorporated in and passed as, Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
*5. As explained in Part III, infra, "the 1976 copyright legislation was the result of many
years of negotiations and compromises between private interests that Congress directly adopted
in drafting the Copyright Act."
*6. See infra Part I.
*7. See infra Part II.
*8. See infra Part IV.
*9. Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999).
*10. The relevant legislative history reads in its entirety:
Section 1011(e) [sic (section 1011(d) contains the amendment)] makes a technical and
clarifying change to the definition of 'work made for hire' in section 101 Copyright Act.
Sound recordings have been registered in the Copyright Office as works made for hire
since being protected in their own right. This clarifying amendment shall not be deemed
to imply that any sound recording or any other work would not otherwise qualify as a
work made for hire in the absence of the amendment made by this subsection.
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an appendix to an appropriations bill of over 1,000 pages.' The
amendment is one sentence found within the appendix in a title re-
garding satellite transmission of copyrighted television content.
1 2
The section in which the work-for-hire amendment appears
bears the label "Technical Amendments"' and the legislative history
calls it a "clarifying change." 4 These characterizations belie the sig-
nificance of the amendment and explain why no debate occurred-
technical amendments usually correct spelling, punctuation, or
numbering without changing the substantive meaning of the law. 1 If
Congress had held hearings on the subject, artists would have
informed Congress that the work-for-hire amendment was not a mere
technical amendment, but instead a significant piece of legislation
with major consequences-namely the elimination of artists'
termination rights. ' Before "clarifying" previous legislation Congress
also should have considered that a United States District Court had
reached the exact opposite conclusion in interpreting the same
legislation just six months earlier.7
Shortly after Congress enacted the work-for-hire amendment,
lobbyists working for record companies, the Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America ('RIAA"), maintained that the work-for-hire
amendment was merely a clarification of existing law, and that "in
everybody's view this was a technical issue.' "" The president of the
RIAA, Hilary Rosen, has since softened the RIAA's position in a letter
to members of the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property. 9
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 106-464, at 105-06 (1999). Discussion of the work-for-hire amendment in
the Congressional Record went no further than to adopt the Conference Report. See 145 CONG.
REC. S14,836 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999); 145 CONG. REC. S14,712 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999); 145
CONG. REC. Hi1,769, H11,811-18 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1999).
*11. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
*12. See Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, S.1948, tit. I. (1999), incorporated in and
passed as, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
*13. Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, S.1948, tit. I,
sec. 1101(d) (1999), incorporated in and passed as, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
*14. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 105 (1999).
*15. See Geoffrey Hull, Work-for-Hire Controversy: Copyright Act Amendment Seen As Blow
to Artists' Sound Recording Rights, ENT. L. & FIN., Jan. 2000, at 1, 4.
*16. See Edward M. Cramer, Copyright Amendment Should Be Repealed, BILLBOARD, Jan.
22, 2000, at 8, 122; Bill Holland et al., Artists, Representatives Speak Out On New Amendment,
BILLBOARD, Jan. 22, 2000, at 123; Bill Holland, Works-For-Hire Provision Sparks Artist Furor,
Demand For Change, BILLBOARD, Jan. 22, 2000, at 5, 122.
*17. See Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999).
*18. Bill Holland, Acts'Reps Decry C'right Clause, BILLBOARD, Jan. 15, 2000, at 1, 75.
*19. See Bill Holland, Congress Faces Music Biz Issues, BILLBOARD, Feb. 12, 2000, at 1, 66.
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Rosen urged the members to hold hearings on the issue in order to
hear the concerns of artists.'0
While Congress appears to have been unaware of the detrimen-
tal impact that the work-for-hire amendment would have on artists,
the RIAA must have understood the amendment's significance for
record companies."2 ' Billboard reports that "the RIAA has tried to
attach the item to various copyright bills for several years."' Further,
Billboard reports that "[the amendment] was not requested by any
member of Congress. Instead, it was apparently inserted into a final
conference report of the Satellite bill by a congressional staffer at the
request of the RIAA.''n
As a result of these events, Congress is reconsidering the work-
for-hire amendment. Representative Howard Coble, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, and other House mem-
bers have called for hearings to review the amendment and its impact
on recording artists. '  Though Representative Coble told Billboard
that the artist community may be "overreacting," he then said "I may
be wrong, and if I'm convinced of that, we can go back to the drawing
board."'  Another important participant in the development of copy-
right law, the Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, expressed
concern "that [the work-for-hire amendment] was suggested in the
middle of the night... obviously ... without input from performers.'2 6
Peters added that "I have also been asked if this is a technical
amendment. The answer is no.'""7
Regardless of whether Congress repeals the work-for-hire
amendment, artists still have a good argument that the amendment
affects only those sound recordings created after November 29, 1999.
The Supreme Court has held that all acts of Congress presumptively
apply prospectively from the effective date of enactment,' especially
acts "affecting contractual or property rights.''2 9 Without explicit
statutory language or legislative history manifesting retroactive in-
tent, courts will decide cases using the law that existed at the time the
*20. Id. at 66.
*21. See Holland, supra note 18, at 75.
*22. Id.
*23. Id. According to Billboard, that staffer "has been hired by the RIAA as its new Wash-
ington lobbyist." Bill Holland, Newsline, BILLBOARD, Feb. 19, 2000, at 87; see also Judy Sara-
sohn, Special Interests: Of Revolving Doors and Turntables, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2000, at A29.
*24. See Holland, supra note 18, at 75.
*25. Id.
*26. Id.
*27. Id.
*28. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994).
*29. Id. at 271.
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facts of each particular case occurred.3  Accordingly, in cases ad-
dressing whether sound recordings created before November 29, 1999
are works-for-hire, courts will ignore the work-for-hire amendment
because it applies only to sound recordings created after November 29,
1999. "31
Given the prospective application of legislation, the work-for-
hire amendment does not render moot this Note's analysis and conclu-
sions. This Note's conclusion that courts should not consider sound
recordings to be works-for-hire remains applicable to the many valu-
able sound recordings created between January 1, 1978 and November
29, 1999. Additionally, the fact that Congress clarified the definition
of "work made for hire" in 1999 adds support to the premise of this
Note's argument-that the work-for-hire definition was previously
unclear, and therefore open for judicial interpretation. "1
Ryan Ashley Rafoth
March 24, 2000
*30. See id. at 265-66, 270.
*31. See Hull, supra note *15, at 4.
*32. Courts are very hesitant to infer the intent of an earlier Congress from legislation by a
later Congress claiming to clarify the earlier Congress's intent, see Cippollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520 (1992), and therefore a court would be within its power to disagree with
the 106th Congress's interpretation of the 1976 Copyright Act. This Note does not go so far as to
suggest that the 1999 amendment itself proves that sound recordings were not works-for-hire
before November 29, 1999, but instead makes the proposition that sound recordings are not
works-for-hire based on the equitable principles, legal precedent, and policies that aid interpre-
tation of the 1976 Act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Undiscovered musical artists frequently sign recording con-
tracts, and subsequently reach high levels of success as recording
artists without sharing substantially in the profits generated by their
success.! Certainly, record companies deserve a large share of the
profits that artists' works generate because the companies risk huge
investments in unknown artists' careers. To offset the financial risk,
record companies require artists to assign ownership of their sound
recording copyrights to the record company in exchange for a "record
deal."
4
The 1976 Copyright Act allows artists to recapture their copy-
rights thirty-five years after a contractual assignment by "termina-
tion" of the assignment.5 If exercised, the right of termination causes
all rights in the work to revert to the artist or his heirs.6 Congress
intended the right of termination to be a safeguard for new artists who
assign their copyrights at a time when they cannot know the future
value of their work, and their bargaining power is limited.7 The right
1. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIc BUSINESS 114-15
(1997). According to Passman, a typical new artist's royalty rate yields $0.96 on a $10.98
cassette. After Passman's estimated recording and promotional costs are deducted, the artist
earns only $0.12 per cassette on 500,000 units sold. See also Joseph B. Anderson, The Work
Made for Hire Doctrine and California Recording Contracts: A Recipe for Disaster, 17 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 587, 593-94 (1995).
2. See Brungard v. Caprice Records, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (not-
ing that if a record does not succeed, the record company bears the loss from the costs of produc-
ing, manufacturing, promoting, and marketing the record); SIDNEY SHEMEL & M. WILLIAM
KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 12 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Sound recording copyrights are a federally recognized property right in an artist's crea-
tive output embodied on a record. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1994); SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY,
supra note 2, at 39 (defining the sound recording); id. at 133 (defining the copyright). Although
many types of non-musical sound recordings can be copyrighted, the term "sound recording"
when used in this Note refers to a musical sound recording. The artist's instrumental and vocal
rendering of a musical composition is the subject matter of a sound recording copyright. The
copyright in the underlying musical composition-that is the musical notes and lyrics on the
sound recording-is a separate work with a separate copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2);
SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 39. A music publishing company usually owns the
composition copyright under an assignment from its composer, see SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY,
supra note 2, at 176, or as a result of a work-for-hire agreement signed by the composer, see
Anderson, supra note 1, at 588, 592. Work-for-hire clauses in music publishing contracts may be
unenforceable, but that question is beyond the scope of this Note.
4. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 3, 12-13 (describing the exchange known
as a "record deal').
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1994).
6. See id. § 203(b).
7. See Mills Music v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 53-54 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3
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of termination gives these artists a chance to negotiate a second sale
of their copyrights at a time when they have greater bargaining power
and greater knowledge of the value of their work.8
Because works-for-hire are not subject to this right of termina-
tion,' record companies prefer that their ownership of sound recording
copyrights be by work-for-hire rather than by assignment." Unfettered
by the right of termination, a record company's ownership of a work-
for-hire copyright endures for the life of the copyright, which is sixty
to eighty-five years longer than the company's ownership of a copy-
right terminated thirty-five years after assigment."'
The work-for-hire exception applies to two types of situations
in which an artist creates copyrightable works at the direction of
another. First, the work of an employee created within the scope of
employment is a work-for-hire.'" Second, an independent contractor's
work is a work-for-hire if the parties agree in writing that the work is
a work-for-hire, and the work is ordered or commissioned for one of
nine specific uses. 3
OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman ed., 1976) [hereinaf-
ter REGISTER'S REPORT] ('The primary purpose of this provision was to protect the author and
his family against unprofitable or improvident disposition of the copyright.').
8. The reclaimed copyright "was intended to revert to [the author or his heirs] so that they
could negotiate new contracts for the further exploitation of the work." REGISTER'S REPORT,
supra note 7, at 53. 'There are no doubt many assignments that give the author less than his
fair share of the revenue actually derived from his work. Some provision to permit authors to
renegotiate their disadvantageous assignments seems desirable." Id. at 54.
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). According to the Copyright Act of 1976, ownership of a copyright
"vests initially in the author or authors of a work" but "in the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author." Id. §
201(a)-(b). If the employing or commissioning party is the author and concomitant owner of the
copyright, then there is no copyright assignment to be terminated. See PASSMAN, supra note 1,
at 288-89.
10. See Works-Made-For-Hire-Practical Perspectives A Roundtable Discussion, 14 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 507, 509 (1990) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion] (statement of Irwin Karp,
discussion moderator).
11. The life of a work-for-hire copyright is 95 years from the date of publication or 120 years
from the date of creation, whichever period expires first. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998), as amended by Copyrights-Term Extension and Music Licensing Exemption Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-298, tit. I, sec. 102(b)(3), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998). In most situations, publication
occurs shortly after creation, meaning that the company's ownership of a work-for-hire copyright
endures for sixty years longer than the company's ownership of an assigned copyright, which
terminates thirty-five years after assignment.
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1994) (definition of "work made for hire'). This Note will refer to
the first work-for-hire exception as the "employment prong." Whether a person is an employee
depends on many factors derived from the common law of agency. See Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989); Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 860 (2d Cir.
1992); Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1992).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (definition of "work made for hire):
[A] work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work,
as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplemen-
1028
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Recording artists' works are not works-for-hire because the
typical artist is not a record company employee 4 and sound recordings
are not one of the types of commissioned works eligible for work-for-
hire status.5 Nonetheless, record contracts frequently include clauses
stating that the artist is a record company employee and/or that all
the artist's work is commissioned as work-for-hire. 6 The law clearly
indicates that these work-for-hire clauses have no effect regarding
whether the objective work-for-hire requirements are met; courts
instead look to the actual relationship between the parties."
While artists may currently dispute the record companies' as-
sertion of work-for-hire status, the companies still own the artists'
copyrights. If the artists successfully challenge work-for-hire status,
however, the companies' ownership would be by assignment rather
than by work-for-hire.'8 Artists' rights to terminate these copyright
assignments will begin vesting in year 2013, thirty-five years after the
first assignments were made under the revised Copyright Act.9 Ac-
cordingly, the issue of enforceability of work-for-hire clauses will ripen
tary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
Id. This Note will refer to the second work-for-hire exception as the "commissioned works
prong."
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part H.B.
16. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 588, 592. A representative work-for-hire clause states:
Artist hereby acknowledges and agrees that the Artwork created by Artist [hereunder is]
work made for hire in that (i) it is prepared within the scope of Company's employment of
Artist hereunder and/or (ii) it constitutes a work specifically ordered by Company for use
as a contribution to a collective work.
1 COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1995, at 39 para. 6(a) (PLI 1995)
[hereinafter ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1995] (sample recording agreement); see also SHEMEL &
KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 654 para. 8 (sample recording agreement stating "that [artist]
acknowledge[s] that your performances in the sound recordings hereunder were made for hire
within the scope of your employment and that [company is] to be considered the author for
purposes of copyrights').
17. See Eliscu v. T.B. Harms Corp., 151 U.S.P.Q. 603, 603-04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (holding
that the contractual phrase "we engage and employ you" does not make artist an employee); 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.02[A][2] (1998) [hereinafter
NIMMER]; Robert A. Kreiss, Scope of Employment and Being an Employee Under the Work-Made-
For-Hire Provision of the Copyright Law: Applying the Common-Law Agency Tests, 40 U. KAN.
L. REV. 119, 146 (1991) (noting that the Copyright Act, and not the contract, determines whether
a work is "made for hire').
18. See Greenwich Film Prods. v. DRG Records, Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1435, 1437-38 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Frost Belt Int'l Recording Enters., Inc. v. Cold Chillin' Records, 758 F. Supp. 131, 136-37
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 5.03[B][1][b][iiJ text accompanying nn.98.1 & 99; 1
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 380 n.89 (1994).
19. See William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers
Managed to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661, 681 (1996).
Termination rights are applicable to assignments made after January 1, 1978. See 17 U.S.C. §
203(a) (1994).
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in 2013, because artists attempting to exercise their rights of termina-
tion must prove that record companies own their work by virtue of
terminable assignments instead of by work-for-hire doctrine."0
Artists will argue that the record company/recording artist re-
lationship' does not give rise to a work-for-hire copyright under the
employment prong and the use of the sound recording does not give
rise to a work-for-hire copyright under the commissioned works prong.
Moreover, artists will argue that a finding that the inalienable right of
termination could be contractually circumvented by superficial work-
for-hire language would violate statutory policy.' If work-for-hire
clauses are unenforceable, then record companies are not permanent
copyright owners, but merely holders of copyright assignments subject
to termination beginning in year 2013. Litigation between record
companies and artists concerning valuable streams of copyright roy-
alty revenue could arise as early as 2003, the beginning of a ten year
period during which artists must serve notice of their intent to termi-
nate."
Part II of this Note applies the employment prong and commis-
sioned works prong of work-for-hire doctrine to the company/artist
relationship to show that recording artists' works are not properly
works-for-hire within the meaning of the statute.' Part Ill of this Note
examines the language within the typical recording contract and
demonstrates that some contractual provisions contradict the record
companies' position that artists' works are works-for-hire. Part IV
examines the unique legislative history and congressional policies
behind the work-for-hire and right of termination provisions. This
legislative history buttresses the conclusion that artists' works are not
works-for-hire. Part V determines that record companies are likely to
lose lawsuits brought by artists beginning in 2013, and concludes that
20. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 10, at 538 (statement of Stanley Rothenberg,
Esq., author and practitioner in the field of copyright, that "[work-for-hire] issues will only come
up at the time that the writer asserts his reversion, which presently means it won't come up for
another twenty-five years at least').
21. This Note will refer to this relationship as the "company/artist relationship."
22. ' Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the con-
trary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant." 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5).
'To give full effect to the primary purpose of the reversionary provision would seem to require
that the renewal right be made unassignable in advance." REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 7, at
53-54.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4)(A).
24. This Note attempts to consider the effects of the most common characteristics of the
company/artist relationship on the work-for-hire analysis. This Note's thesis may not be appli-
cable to all company/artist relationships because these relationships vary greatly across compa-
nies, between different artists, and through time.
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renegotiation of the artist's royalty rate would best effectuate the
interests of both parties.
II. APPLYING WORK-FOR-HIRE DOCTRINE TO THE RECORDING
ARTIST/RECORD COMPANY RELATIONSHIP
The 1976 Copyright Act divides laborers into two categories to
determine whether their work is work-for-hire: employees and inde-
pendent contractors.' Whether a laborer is an employee or an inde-
pendent contractor is a threshold determination that directs a court to
the appropriate subsection of the work-for-hire definition in 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 for consideration of other statutory requirements."6 The finding
that a laborer is an employee results in the conclusion that the copy-
right in the work of that laborer is a work-for-hire copyright. 7 The
finding that a laborer is an independent contractor may result in the
conclusion that the copyright is a work-for-hire copyright, provided
additional statutory requirements are met.-8
The finding that an artist's work is not a work-for-hire is the
indispensable prerequisite to the artist's right to terminate because a
work-for-hire is not subject to termination under the copyright law.'
This Note separately considers and rejects the argument that the
recording artist is a record company employee under the employment
prong in 17 U.S.C. § 101(1), and the alternative argument that the
recording artist is an independent contractor whose work meets the
requirements of the commissioned works prong in 17 U.S.C. § 101(2).'
25. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742-43, 750-51 (1989).
The Supreme Court has eliminated a longstanding theory of interpretation that certain inde-
pendent contractors could be considered statutory employees depending on the hiring party's
degree of control over their work. See id. at 741-42. For a detailed discussion of the disagreeing
interpretations of work-for-hire doctrine preceding Reid, see Anne Marie Hill, Note, The "Work
for Hire" Definition in the Copyright Act of 1976: Conflict Over Specially Ordered or Commis-
sioned Works, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 559, 571-86 (1989), and Mamie Deaton Lucas, Note, Copy-
right, Independent Contractors, and the Work-For-Hire Doctrine: Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 67 N.C. L. REV. 994, 1002-08 (1989).
26. See Respect, Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1119 (N.D.
111. 1993).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (definition of "work made for hire'); see also infra Part H.A.
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (definition of "work made for hire'); see also infra Part II.B.
29. See supra note 9.
30. In much work-for-hire litigation, the appropriate work-for-hire category is clear or
uncontested. See, e.g., Quintanilla v. Texas Television, Inc., 139 F.3d 494, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1998);
Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1997); Hi-Tech Video
Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1095 (6th Cir. 1995); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v.
Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1990); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 831
F. Supp. 295, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Because the company/artist situation has not yet been
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A. Is the Recording Artist an Employee of the Record Company Under
the Employment Prong of Work-For-Hire Doctrine in
17 U.S.C. § 101(1)?
If a hired party3' is an employee according to the common law
of agency, then § 101(1) applies, and all the party's works created
within the scope of employment are works-for-hire. Whether a hired
party is an employee rests on an examination of many factors set forth
by the common law of agency and the Supreme Court.3 No factor
alone is determinative, 4 and courts weigh the factors differently de-
pending on the circumstances of the case.5
1. Right to Control and Actual Control of Production
Factors that suggest the existence of an employment relation-
ship include the hiring party's right to control and actual control over
litigated, this Note examines both work-for-hire prongs, assuming both will be argued either in
separate litigation or alternatively in the same case.
31. In accordance with judicial opinions and literature on the subject, this Note hereinafter
uses the terms "hiring party" and '"ired party" to define the parties to the potential work-for-
hire relationship.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (definition of "work made for hire); Reid, 490 U.S. at 750-51.
33. The Supreme Court in Reid listed thirteen factors, mostly derived from the
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 220. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52 (listing (1) the hiring party's
right to control the manner and means of production; (2) the skill required of the hired party; (3)
the source of the hired party's instrumentalities and tools; (4) the location of the work; (5) the
duration of the relationship between the parties; (6) whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional work; (7) the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to
work; (8) the method of payment; (9) the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; (10)
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; (11) whether the hiring
party is in business; (12) whether the hiring party provides employee benefits; and (13) the tax
treatment of the hired party). Correctly interpreting the Reid Court's list as non-exhaustive, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals added four more factors to the list. See Marco v. Accent Publ'g
Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1992) (adding (14) actual control over the details of the work;
(15) the hired party's occupation; (16) local custom; and (17) the parties' understanding about the
nature of their relationship); see also Kreiss, supra note 17, at 157-204 (considering the work-for-
hire ramifications of all common law agency factors); Corey L. Wishner, Note, Whose Work is it
Anyway?: Revisiting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid in Defining the Employer-
Employee Relationship Under the "Work Made for Hire"Doctrine, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 393, 402-
15 (1995) (examining the common law agency factors that have been applied in significant work-
for-hire cases). This Note compiles similar employment prong factors into groups in order to
attain a logical flow in the discussion.
34. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.
35. See, e.g., Hi-Tech, 58 F.3d at 1099; Respect, Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women,
815 F. Supp. 1112, 1117-18 (N.D. IlM. 1993). The court in Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d
Cir. 1992), declared that a core group of factors should predominate the inquiry in all cases, but
the Supreme Court has not adopted this approach. See Respect, 815 F. Supp. at 1118 n.11.
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the hired party's work process." Courts are more likely to classify
recording artists with little creative control over their recordings as
employees than artists with great creative control." Established art-
ists retain creative control over their albums, within certain contrac-
tual style parameters." A new artist retains less creative control,
although the artist may select the songs recorded, choose the pro-
ducer, and make other creative decisions subject to record company
approval.39
In practice, record companies give many artists-both estab-
lished and unestablished-a "substantial voice" in selecting the songs
to be recorded."' Moreover, many artists exercise creative control by
writing the compositions they record for their albums. 1 In fact, a
record company often does not exercise many of its control rights
because the company views its relationship with an artist as a "crea-
tive partnership," in which confidence in and deference to the artist's
opinions promote relational goodwill. 2 Accordingly, both the contrac-
tual and the actual allocation of control in the company/artist rela-
tionship often weigh against finding that the artist is a record com-
pany employee.
The record producer's degree of independence from the record
company suggests that the company has little control over production.
Since the late 1970s, much of sound recording production has been
controlled by independent record producers who are given "carte
blanche [control] as to supervision of sessions and post-production
editing of tapes.""3 Sometimes, artists even produce or co-produce their
36. See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1550. Although actual control was not expressly listed in Reid,
the Court considered it. See id. at 1550 n.4. Actual control often demonstrates right to control;
thus the analyses of the two factors are virtually indistinguishable. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 750
n.17.
37. See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1552. In Marco, the hired photographer controlled camera set-
tings, light, and film processing techniques. Id. at 1551-52. The hiring party's supervision and
control of the subject matter and composition of photographic images did not give rise to an
employment relationship. See id.
38. See PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 125-26.
39. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 3, 9; see, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
1995, supra note 16, at 30 para. 4(a) (sample recording agreement requiring the artist to submit
the name of a record producer and the songs to be recorded for company approval); id. at 58 para.
18(a)-(b) (sample recording agreement giving the artist the right to approve singles).
40. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 3, 9.
41. See id. at 9.
42. Katherine Woods, Esq., Director of Legal and Business Affairs, RCA Label Group, Legal
Problems in the Music Industry, seminar conducted at Vanderbilt University School of Law (Feb.
25, 1999) (notes on file with author).
43. SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 49. Record producers "participate signifi-
cantly in choosing appropriate musical material and in selecting and supervising arrangers,
accompanists, studios, and engineers." Id. at 50. A producer's creative contribution would
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own recordings, suggesting that the artist has a great deal of control
over the record.4 When a court seeks to determine whether an em-
ployment relationship exists, the right-to-control factor favors self-
produced or independently produced artists because creative control
lies with the artist, or at least outside the hands of the record com-
pany.
45
Although record companies often retain a right to approve the
finished product, in weighing the right-to-control factor, courts are
more concerned with control over detail decisions rather than control
over general objectives.46 A company's right to approval is often found
in a contractual requirement that an artist's work be "technically
satisfactory," or the more stringent "commercially satisfactory."47 The
former requirement favors the artist because it requires only that the
recording be of technical quality and clarity sufficient for reproduc-
tion. 8 Although the latter requirement allows the company to make
the artist re-record songs that the company feels are commercially
unacceptable, the right to accept or reject the finished product is much
less significant than close supervision of creation and should not lead
a court to conclude that an employment relationship exists.49
entitle him to a share of the copyright, see SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 40, but
record companies require producers to sign work-for-hire agreements similar to those that artists
sign, see Roundtable Discussion, supra note 10, at 526 (statement of Charles Sanders, represen-
tative of the National Music Publishers Association). Producers' work-for-hire agreements,
however, may be unenforceable for the same reasons that artists' work-for-hire agreements may
be unenforceable. Producers and artists may need to act together in order to terminate the
assignment of a copyright in a joint work according to 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1). See Randy S. Frisch
& Matthew J. Fortnow, Termination of Copyrights in Sound Recordings: Is There a Leak in the
Record Company Vaults?, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 211, 228 (1993).
44. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 12, 49.
45. See Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606-07 (1st Cir. 1993). Even though the hiring
party told the hired band what songs to record, he made no artistic contribution because "[the
hiring party] did not serve as the engineer at the sessions or direct the manner in which the
songs were played or sung." Id. at 607.
46. See, e.g., Hi-Tech Video Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1097 (6th
Cir. 1995). The hiring party in Hi-Tech had control over "artistic objectives," but the court found
that the importance of this fact was diminished by the "[high level] of the skill required of the
[hired party], as well as the [hired party's] artistic contributions to the product." Id. Though the
hiring party in another case did have a "limited kind of input to the [work]-for example, by
suggesting revisions ... [i]t was [the hired party] and not [the hiring party] who was responsible
for the [work's] content and flavor." Respect, Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F.
Supp. 1112, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
47. See PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 125.
48. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 597.
49. A hiring party's right to final approval does not make a hired party an employee. See
Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 874, 877 (5th Cir. 1997) (agreeing that
the hired party was an independent contractor though there was a requirement that advertising
jingles be approved by the hiring party); Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1550-51 (3d
Cir. 1992) (finding independent contractor status despite a hiring party's right to final approval
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The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a hired party
can be an employee based on the control factor alone.' Control is just
one factor to be weighed along with many others in determining
whether an artist is a record company employee."
2. Structure of Work and Compensation
Courts consider specific aspects of the structure of the artist's
work and compensation to determine whether the hired party is an
employee. These aspects include the hiring party's discretion over
when and how long the hired party works, the hiring party's right to
assign additional projects to the hired party, and the method of pay-
ment.52 Unstructured work hours and lump-sum payment on a job-by-
job basis suggest that the recording artist is an independent contrac-
tor, while periodic pay for projects assigned during normal work hours
indicates that the recording artist is an employee.
One factor suggesting that artists are not employees is the
highly unpredictable duration of their relationships with record com-
of photographs). But see Anderson, supra note 1, at 597. In making the argument that artists
should be entitled to minimum wage under California law, Professor Anderson suggests that the
commercial satisfaction requirement is enough control to make the artist an employee under
California labor law. See id. The result is arguably different under the common law of agency.
Applying the common law, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Marco v. Accent Publishing Co.
found that despite the hiring party's right to make a hired photographer reshoot unsatisfactory
images, the hired photographer was not an employee. Marco, 969 F.2d at 1550-51.
50. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 741-43-(1989). An ar-
gument usually made by the hiring party after the work-for-hire control test fails is that a
significant degree of control makes the hiring party joint author of the hired, party's work
(making it a "joint work"). See id. at 753; Marco, 969 F.2d at 1553; Respect, 815 F. Supp. at 1119.
Joint authorship requires a "material" creative contribution, like that of a record producer.
SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 194; Quintanilla v. Texas Television, Inc., 139 F.3d
494, 499 n.24 (5th Cir. 1998); Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy
Enters., Inc., 815 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1987); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669; see supra note 43. A record company's contributions are probably
not sufficient for joint authorship, unless record company personnel produce the record. See
Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 607 (1st Cir. 1993); SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2,
at 194; Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 43, at 226-27. Regardless, joint ownership would be a vast
improvement over work-for-hire because the artist would own half the copyright, thereby having
the right to exploit the work and keep half of any profits earned by exploitation. See 17 U.S.C. §
201(a) (1994); Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 337 (finding that even if the hiring party had successfully
established joint ownership of video tapes filmed by an independent contractor, the independent
contractor would have a unilateral right to exploit the tapes as a co-owner of the copyright);
SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 260 (explaining that joint copyright owners must
account to each other, which means they must equally share all royalties).
51. See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551; Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 335-36.
52. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.
53. See Wishner, supra note 33, at 407, 410-11.
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panies.' Likewise, an employment relationship is refuted by the art-
ist's work hours, which are not standard and are scheduled at the
artist's discretion.55 Although record companies impose final album
deadlines," deadlines do not indicate employment because deadline
restrictions are no different between independent contractors and
employees.'
A hiring party's right to assign additional work favors the
finding that the hired party is an employee.' In most record contracts,
record companies reserve the right to assign work in the form of addi-
tional recordings or video performances. However, record contracts
often limit these rights,5 making them much narrower than the open-
ended right to assign work that exists in many formal employment
situations.
Record companies pay artists for their services by the job like
independent contractors rather than employees.6' Companies pay
artists by the album in the form of recoupable advances or recording
54. The record company unilaterally decides whether to make another album with the artist
at the end of each "option period." A new artist's record contract requires between six and ten
option periods. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 3-6. An option period might last
eighteen months, binding the artist to the company for a total of nine to fifteen years. See
PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 121; SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 123 (stating that
"[successful] artists tend to spend their entire career at one company"). However, the com-
pany/artist relationship ceases anytime the record company decides to release the artist. An
artst's request for early release may be granted under certain conditions. See PASSMAN, supra
note 1, at 129-30; see, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1995, supra note 16, at 42 para. 7(a)
(sample recording agreement)
55. The record contract sets forth the minimum number of records required of the artist per
year, but does not require the artist to work any particular hours or on any schedule of comple-
tion. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 14-15; see, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
1995, supra note 16, at 30 para. 4(a) (sample recording agreement requiring the artist to "sched-
ule and conduct recording sessions).
56. See, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1995, supra note 16, at 21-22 para. 2(a), (c) (sample
recording agreement setting forth number of albums and album delivery deadlines).
57. The deadline for completion of Mr. Reid's sculpture did not affect the Supreme Court's
finding that Mr. Reid was an independent contractor. See Community for Creative Non-Violence
v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 753 (1989). The court in Marco directly stated that "deadlines do not alter
an independent contractor's discretion over work hours." Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co., 969 F.2d
1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1992).
58. See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551.
59. See, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1995, supra note 16, at 58 para. 19 (sample re-
cording agreement providing that the decision to make videos will be "mutual" between artist
and company); 1 COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1994, at 143-44 para.
3(a)-(b) (PLI 1994) [hereinafter ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1994] (sample recording agreement
allowing the record company to request only one additional album per option period).
60. Mr. Reid was paid upon "completion of a specific job, a method by which independent
contractors are often compensated." Reid, 490 U.S. at 753 (quoting Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d
1532, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
RIGHT OF TERMINATION
budgets."' Royalties paid to artists after record companies recoup the
recording costs and advances62 are not like employee wages. Instead,
the royalty method of payment "generally weighs against finding a
work-for-hire relationship."' Record companies do not pay artists
benefits, provide workers' compensation or unemployment insurance,
or withhold taxes and social security as they do for their true employ-
ees.' The failure to treat hired parties as employees for payroll pur-
poses weighs significantly against finding an employment relation-
ship, and is, in one court's opinion, a "virtual admission" that the
hired party is not an employee.' The structure of the work relation-
ship, evidenced by the absence of proper payroll treatment, a job-by-
job payment structure, and unstructured, non-traditional work hours,
indicates that the company/artist relationship is not an employment
relationship.'
3. Financial and Logistical Responsibilities
Many courts consider a hired party to be an independent con-
tractor if he provides his own tools and work facilities, and is respon-
sible for hiring and paying assistants. ' Although recording artists
provide their own musical instruments and sheet music, the record
company pays all recording and editing costs, pays for or provides a
studio, and pays fees for accompanying musicians and engineers.' The
company's absorption of these production expenses favors the finding
of an employment relationship, 9 but some courts have found financial
61. See PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 111-12 (explaining recording funds and advances).
62. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 3-4 (explaining royalties and recoupment).
63. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 555 (2d Cir. 1995).
64. See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 43, at 219.
65. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1992). "The importance of [payroll treat-
ment] is underscored by the fact that every case since Reid that has applied the test has found
the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hiring party failed to extend benefits
or pay social security taxes." Id. at 863.
66. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 753 (1989).
67. See id. at 752-53.
68. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 3.
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) cmt. k (1958); Wishner, supra note 33,
at 406. An argument favoring artists is that successful artists effectively bear their recording
costs because record contracts allow record companies to recoup the entire recording budget
against the artist's royalties. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 590-92 (explaining recoupment and
how an artist ultimately pays for the cost of an album); Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 43, at 220;
see, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1994, supra note 59, at 150 para. 8(b) (sample recording
agreement stating that the "[artist] shall be solely responsible for and shall pay all recording
costs incurred in the production of masters). The weakness of this argument is the fact that
record companies risk large recording budgets and never recoup on records that do not produce
any royalties. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 5; Anderson, supra note 1, at 591-
92.
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assistance an insignificant indicator of employment."0 Moreover, many
record contracts require the artist to select and secure contracts with
the producer and other assistants, schedule recording sessions,7' and
pay the producer's royalties. '2 That the artist bears significant finan-
cial and logistical responsibilities favors the finding that the artist is
not a record company employee.'
4. General Nature of the Transaction
If the hired party's activities constitute a distinct skill or occu-
pation of a type that the hiring party does not normally hire em-
ployees to perform, then a court is more likely to consider the hired
party to be an independent contractor instead of an employee.' Artists
are highly skilled members of a distinct occupation; 5 their skill set is
defined, like the skills of architects and photographers, which distin-
guishes them from assembly line workers and sales persons." On the
other hand, record companies hire artists as a regular matter of their
business," a fact that distinguishes Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, in which the Supreme Court found a sculptor to be an
independent contractor of a charity because the sculpting engagement
70. See Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606 (1st Cir. 1993). A hiring party booked and
paid for a band's studio time, yet was not considered their employer. See id. Likewise, despite
reimbursement of an author's costs to write a book, the resulting book was not considered a
work-for-hire. See Respect, Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1118
(N.D. IlM. 1993).
71. See PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 139; see, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1995, supra note
16, at 30 para. 4(a)-(b) (sample recording agreement stating that the "artist shall schedule and
conduct recording sessions ... [and] engage artists, producers, musicians, recording studios and
other personnel and facilities for the recording sessions); ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1994,
supra note 59, at 151 para. 9 (sample recording agreement stating that "[e]ach master subject
hereto shall be produced by a producer selected by [artist] and approved by [company]').
72. Artists usually get an "all-in" royalty, which means that the producer's share of royal-
ties are included in the artist's share and the artist is contractually liable to the producer. See
PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 110, 139; see, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1994, supra note 59, at
151 para. 9 (sample recording agreement stating that the "[artist] shall be solely responsible for
and shall pay all monies becoming payable to such producer).
73. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752-53 (1989).
74. See Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1992).
75. See Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding hotel band musi-
cians to be members of a distinct and highly skilled occupation).
76. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that other courts have
held "architects, photographers, graphic artists, drafters, and indeed computer programmers to
be highly-skilled independent contractors'). To be an independent contractor, an artist's skill
need not be that of an expert in the field; rather only an ordinary degree of skill is necessary. See
Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551. A court should examine the "skill necessary to perform the work"
instead of the hired party's individual level of expertise. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862.
77. See PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 83-85 (explaining that a record company's business cen-
ters around selling recorded performances of artists).
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was a one-time occurrence and not part of the charity's regular busi-
ness.
78
The parties' beliefs as to the character of their relationship can
inform a court's determination about whether a hired party is an
employee under the law of agency." From the ostensible structure of
the company/artist relationship, a court can infer that the parties do
not believe they are in an employment relationship.' Contractual
disclaimers denying any agency or employment relationship and rec-
ord companies' refusal to treat artists as employees for tax and bene-
fits purposes support this inference."
5. Conclusion: The Recording Artist Is Not an Employee of the
Record Company Under the Employment Prong of Work-For-Hire
Doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 101(1)
In reviewing the common law factors, a court would find that
record companies treat artists much differently than internal company
employees such as receptionists and bookkeepers. Because the courts
have adopted a common law rule for determination of the existence or
absence of an employment relationship, artists can find support in any
decision finding that a hired party is not an employee under the com-
mon law agency test.' One such strikingly analogous case is Hilton
International Co. v. NLRB, in which the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that members of a musical band were not employees of a
hotel that hired them for long-term engagements.' Like a recording
artist, the bandleader scheduled rehearsal and vacation times, se-
lected the musicians, instruments and sheet music, repertoire, style,
78. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-53. Cf. Marco, 969 F.2d at 1552 (distinguishing Reid because un-
like the hiring party in Reid, the hiring party in Marco was in a regular business, which indi-
cated employment).
79. See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1550; Wishner, supra note 33, at 408.
80. Objective observations are useful evidence of the parties' beliefs. See Kreiss, supra note
17, at 148-49.
81. See id. at 149-50, 173.
82. See id. at 136-41, 141 n.81 (noting the common law roots of the agency test). Besides
the Copyright Act, many federal statutes use the common law agency test to determine when
employment relationships exist, including ERISA, Federal Rules of Evidence, and Internal
Revenue Code. See id. at 137. Courts have recognized the inter-statutory application of the
common law agency test by citing Reid in non-copyright contexts. See, e.g., Mayeske v. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 905 F.2d 1548, 1553-54 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Penn v. Howe-Baker
Eng'rs, Inc., 898 F.2d 1096, 1101-03 (5th Cir. 1990); Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1038 (10th
Cir. 1989).
83. Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1982). Although having nothing
to do with copyright or work-for-hire, the Hilton case was cited in Reid for its treatment of the
common law agency factors. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751,
751 nn.18-19, 752 n.27 (1989).
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and tempo, and contracted for a lump-sum payment. ' Also, the hotel
musicians were not subject to the same personnel rules and grievance
procedures as were the formal hotel employees.' Like a record com-
pany, the hotel paid the side musicians and controlled the size of the
band, the general type of music, and the location of the band's per-
formances.' Nonetheless, these circumstances did not constitute "sig-
nificant authority" over the musicians' manner of performance, and
the court therefore found that the musicians were not employees.' 7
The close similarity between the hotel/band relationship in Hil-
ton and the company/artist relationship suggests that artists are not
employees under the employment prong of work-for-hire doctrine. Like
the band in Hilton, recording artists have both contractual and actual
control over their songs and performances. As in Hilton, record com-
panies do not pay benefits, and artists bear many financial and logis-
tical responsibilities. In light of the Hilton decision, record companies
bear a high burden in proving that artists are employees.' One
prominent copyright scholar broadly states that "parties who hire
outsiders are unlikely to be deemed authors under the employee prong
of the work-made-for-hire definition."89 If a recording artist is not a
record company employee according to the common law agency factors,
then he is an independent contractor,' which implicates the commis-
sioned works prong of work-for-hire doctrine as the next step in the
analysis to determine whether an artist's work is work-for-hire.
B. Is a Sound Recording Eligible for Work-For-Hire Status Under
the Commissioned Works Prong of Work-For-Hire
Doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)?
Whereas an employee's work is always work-for-hire, an inde-
pendent contractor's work is not work-for-hire unless the work is
commissioned in accordance with the two requirements of 17 U.S.C. §
101(2).' First, the independent contractor and the commissioning
84. See Hilton, 690 F.2d at 321-22.
85. See id. at 321.
86. See id. Further indicia of employment present in Hilton, but not present in the com-
pany/artist relationship, such as payroll tax withholdings, failed to persuade the Hilton court
that the musicians were hotel employees. Id. at 322-23.
87. Id. at 321.
88. See Kreiss, supra note 17, at 148.
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1994) (definition of "work made for hire").
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party must both sign2 an express agreement93 stating that the com-
missioning party has specially ordered or commissioned the work as a
work-for-hire, ' a requirement that most record contracts satisfy.
Second, the commissioning party must specially order or commission
the work for use as one of nine types of works eligible for work-for-hire
status under 17 U.S.C. § 101(2).' Of the nine types, only four could
possibly reference musical sound recordings. Accordingly, artists'
sound recordings are work-for-hire under the commissioned works
prong if commissioned by record companies as part of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, as a compilation, as a contribution to a
collective work, or as a supplementary work.9
1. As Part of a Motion Picture or Other Audiovisual Work
A typical artist's sound recording is not a work-for-hire by vir-
tue of being commissioned as part of a motion picture or other audio-
visual work.' According to the Copyright Act, motion pictures are part
of a class called "audiovisual works," which are defined as "a series of
92. See Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding
a work-for-hire agreement invalid because it was signed by only one party).
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2); Respect, Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp.
1112, 1119 (N.D. IM. 1993); Greenwich Film Prods. v. DRG Records, Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1435,
1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that commissioned works are not works-for-hire without an
express agreement, although the works in question fell within one of the nine enumerated
categories). The writing must precede creation of the work. See Schiller, 969 F.2d at 412-13
(requiring that the work-for-hire agreement precede creation of the work in order to define
ownership of intellectual property so that it is "readily marketable'); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Record companies that attempt to acquire
previously and independently created master recordings as works-for-hire are "overreaching."
PATRY, supra note 18, at 380 n.89.
94. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 560 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the
failure to use "work-for-hire" language falls short of the writing requirement). But see 1
NIMMER, supra note 17, § 5.03[B][2][b] nn.122.7 & 122.8 and accompanying text (holding that
the magic words "work-for-hire" are not required if intent to invoke work-for-hire doctrine is
abundantly clear).
95. See supra note 16 (containing exemplary work-for-hire clauses). Because most record
contracts satisfy the first requirement, this Note focuses on the second requirement in analyzing
whether an artist's work is work-for-hire under the Copyright Act.
96. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 5.03[B][2][a]; see, e.g., M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron
Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that architectural works are not one of
the nine types of independent contractors' works eligible for work-for-hire status).
97. Irrelevant categories for this Note's purposes are works commissioned "as a translation,
as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas." 17 U.S.C. §
101(2) (1994) (definition of "work made for hire').
98. See id.
99. See PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 286. A soundtrack created under contract with a film
production company is "clearly commissioned for a motion picture." Greenwich Film Prods. v.
DRG Records, Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1435, 1436, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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related images.., together with accompanying sounds, if any.""® A
sound recording is "a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but
not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work."'
Because a sound recording is defined as something other than
an audiovisual work, the two categories must be mutually exclusive.
Audiovisual works, therefore, cannot encompass purely audio works. 2
Moreover, Congress separately listed "sound recordings" and "motion
pictures and other audiovisual works" as categories of copyrightable
subject matter in 17 U.S.C. § 102.03 To hold that a sound recording
could be an audiovisual work would create a redundancy in this
neighboring clause of the Act."4
Record companies might argue that any sound recording could
be used in a music video under the terms of most record contracts, and
that this potential for use as part of an audiovisual work triggers the
category. However, record contracts only assert the company's right to
make videos and usually expressly negate any specific intention to do
so. 0" The absence of any specific intent to use sound recordings in
music videos forecloses the record company's right to claim that sound
recordings are commissioned as part of audiovisual works."
2. As a Compilation or a Contribution to a Collective Work
A typical artist's sound recording is not a work-for-hire by vir-
tue of being commissioned as a compilation unless the song or album
100. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definitions of "motion pictures" and "audiovisual works').
101. Id. (definition of "sound recordings').
102. See Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 878 (5th Cir. 1997) ('That
Congress chose to create these separate categories indicates that it recognized a distinction
between audiovisual and purely audio works.").
103. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6)-(7).
104. Courts avoid statutory interpretations that would make neighboring clauses redundant.
See Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 256 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1995, supra note 16, at 58 para. 19(a) (sample re-
cording agreement stating that "neither Company nor Artist is under any obligation whatsoever
[to make videos]').
106. Specific intention is probably required by the plain meaning of the statute, which states
that a work is a work-for-hire if "specially ordered or commissioned for use as ... an audiovisual
work." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "work made for hire) (emphasis added). A court declined to
hold that advertising jingles were commissioned as part of audiovisual works because the
evidence did not indicate precisely which jingles were commissioned for use on television versus
radio. See Lulirama, 128 F.3d at 878-79, 879 n.6. Even if a sound recording is clearly commis-
sioned for both a video (audiovisual use) and a phonorecord (purely audio use), which use
determines work-for-hire status is unclear. See id. at 879 n.6. The purpose of a video is to
promote record sales, thus videos are merely by-products of commissioning sound recordings for
pure audio uses. See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 43, at 223.
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is a collection of separately preexisting materials."' A song is a fully
integrated work rather than an assembled collection of separately
preexisting materials; the parts of a song-such as voice and instru-
mental-are assembled to form a "unitary" whole.' °
Likewise, though a record album consists of several individual
sound recordings, it is nonetheless an integrated work-a package of
songs unified by a common concept." Indeed, under many record
contracts, an artist must deliver record albums as a set of master
tapes, "completed, fully edited, mixed, leadered and equalized... and
ready for [the record company's] manufacture of records.""0 If the
album's sound recordings are considered a unitary whole, then the
album cannot be a compilation, and the songs on the album cannot be
contributions to a collective work."'
Even if each song on a record is deemed a separate work, a rec-
ord album may lack the "minimal degree of creativity" necessary to
support a compilation or a collective work copyright."' The creativity
requirement is not met unless there is a discretionary selection and
assembly of works from among a greater body of preexisting works."'
Creativity may be present in an assemblage of some of an author's
works, but creativity is not present in an assemblage of all an author's
107. The Copyright Act defines a compilation as "a work formed by the collection and assem-
bling of preexisting materials'or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(definition of "compliation).
108. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 68-69 (Comm. Print 1965), reprinted in 4
OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman ed., 1976) [hereinaf-
ter COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION PART 6].
109. See Mike Milom, Esq., Legal Problems in the Music Industry, seminar conducted at
Vanderbilt University School of Law (Jan. 28, 1999) (notes on file with author).
110. ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1994, supra note 59, at 188 para. 24(g) (sample recording
agreement).
111. A song is not a contribution to a collective work unless a record album is a collective
work. The Copyright Act defines a collective work as "a work, such as a periodical issue, anthol-
ogy, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent
works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of
"collective work"). Collective works are a type of compilation whose contributions are individu-
ally copyrightable. See id. (definition of "compliation); 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 3.02 text
accompanying nn.10-11.
112. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). Feist requires
minimal creativity of compilations explicitly and of collective works implicitly because collective
works are a type of compilation. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "compilation").
113. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 3.02 text accompanying nn.10-14.
A collective work does not result "where relatively few separate elements have been brought
together," such as "three one-act plays." H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 122 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5737.
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works because no selection process occurs."' An ordinary record album
consists of all an artist's newest material recorded explicitly for that
album, not an original selection of material from preexisting works,"5
and an album therefore lacks the requisite degree of creativity to
garner compilation or collective work status.
3. As a Supplementary Work
A sound recording is not a work-for-hire by virtue of being
commissioned as a supplementary work unless a song or album is a
"secondary adjunct!' to another author's work.'16 Record companies
discourage sampling,17 which is reproducing part of another artist's
sound recording within one's own." 8 Without sampling or some other
multiple artist configuration on a single album, an artist's sound
recordings cannot be supplementary works. Sound recordings on an
album comprised of various artists' songs are not supplementary
works unless a single artist's songs predominate, making the other
sound recordings "secondary."1
9
114. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 3.02 text accompanying nn.13-14.
115. Most record contracts require albums of a single artist's previously unreleased record-
ings. See PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 125; see, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1994, supra note
59, at 144 para. 3(c) (sample recording agreement stating that "[e]ach master delivered
hereunder shall consist of [artist's] newly recorded studio performances). A greatest hits album
or an album consisting of several artists' work may be a collective work. See SHEMEL &
KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 193. Yet, record contracts do not explicitly commission sound
recordings for these uses. See supra note 106 (explaining that without specific intent to make
videos, sound recordings are probably not commissioned for use as part of audiovisual works,
either).
116. A supplementary work is:
a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for
the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting
upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial
illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer mate-
rial for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes.
17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (definition of "work made for hire").
117. See PASSMAN, supra note 1, at 296 (obtaining licenses to use samples, or "clearing"
them, is a "major pain in the rear end"); see, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1995, supra note 16,
at 32 para. 4(d) (sample recording agreement imposing onerous burdens if the artist uses
samples on an album).
118. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 47.
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (definition of "work made for hire). The secondary song would
also have to be "for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising,
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work" in order to be considered a supple-
mentary work. Id.
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4. Conclusion: A Sound Recording Is Not Eligible for Work-For-Hire
Status Under the Commissioned Works Prong of Work-For-Hire
Doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)
Because the categories of commissioned works eligible for
work-for-hire status do not expressly include sound recordings and are
narrowly defined, sound recordings are probably not eligible for work-
for-hire status under the commissioned works prong of work-for-hire
doctrine. Not only have several prominent copyright scholars con-
cluded that artists' works are not works-for-hire under the commis-
sioned works prong,' a United States District Court has recently
agreed. On March 5, 1999, the court in Ballas v. Tedesco held that
"sound recordings are not a work-for-hire under the second part of the
statute because they do not fit within any of the nine enumerated
categories."m1
III. THE EFFECT OF COMMON RECORD CONTRACT CLAUSES ON THE
WORK-FOR-HIRE DETERMINATION
In addition to the doctrinal analysis prescribed by the two
prongs of work-for-hire doctrine, a court should consider that language
in some record contracts undermines the argument that artists' works
are works-for-hire. Certain grant-of-rights in contracts implicitly
admits doubt about the enforceability of work-for-hire clauses by
providing for an assignment in the alternative. Also, disclaimer lan-
guage denying any employment relationship inherently contradicts
any future claim by record companies that artists are employees.
A. Admission of Doubt in Grant-of-Rights Language
In addition to work-for-hire clauses, most record companies in-
clude in their contracts language providing for a copyright assignment
in case work-for-hire clauses are unenforceable." This "belt and sus-
120. See SHEMEL & KRAsILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 193 (opining that record companies have
no argument under the commissioned works prong of work-for-hire); Anderson, supra note 1, at
600 n.58 (concluding that sound recordings are not listed as commissioned works eligible for
work.for-hire status).
121. Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999).
122. See, e.g., Frost Belt Int'l Recording Enters., Inc. v. Cold Chillin' Records, 758 F. Supp.
131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1990):
Each Master Recording made under this agreement or during its term, from the Inception
of Recording, will be considered a 'work made for hire' for [the record company], if any
such Master Recording is determined not to be a 'work made for hire' it will be trans-
ferred to [the record company] by this agreement, together with all rights in it.
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penders" language"' probably ensures that record companies get at
least an assignment of the artist's copyrights if the work-for-hire
clause does not produce work-for-hire ownership." Even absent an
express assignment provision, work-for-hire clauses probably consti-
tute implied assignments because the parties' intent to transfer own-
ership is evident from work-for-hire language." A copyright assign-
ment, whether express or implied, limits consideration of work-for-
hire clause enforceability until artists could terminate the assign-
ments thirty-five years later, which is why work-for-hire disputes will
not arise until 2013."26 Albeit legally acceptable, courts may consider
use of the assignment provision as a safety net to be an admission of
doubt about the enforceability of the work-for-hire clause.' 7
Most record contracts contain work-for-hire clauses, which
characterize artists as employees and record albums as commissioned
works, or simply state that all work created under the contract is
work-for-hire."8 However, courts unanimously hold that the objective
tests set forth by § 101(1)-the employment prong-and the nine
categories of works eligible for work-for-hire status under § 101(2)-
the commissioned works prong--cannot be contractually overridden."
Nonetheless, artists who do not understand the law might assume
that the contractual characterization of an employment relationship
makes it legally binding. A false representation of an artist's status by
a record company, if honestly believed by the artist, could support a
claim for fraud in the acquisition of copyrights."' Although record
companies probably do not intend to defraud artists, Rhoads v. Harvey
Id.
123. PATRY, supra note 18, at 380 n.89.
124. See Greenwich Film Prods. v. DRG Records, Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1435, 1437-38 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Frost Belt, 758 F. Supp. at 136-37.
125. See Kreiss, supra note 17, at 149.
126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
127. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The court in
Playboy found assignment language inconsistent with work-for-hire language because assign-
ment and work-for-hire theories are inherently contradictory. Id. If the parties understand a
work to be a work-for-hire, then the hiring party is the statutory author, which makes an
assignment unnecessary. See id.
128. See supra note 16 (containing exemplary work-for-hire clauses).
129. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
130. See Rhoads v. Harvey Publications, Inc., 640 P.2d 198, 198-201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). A
publisher of comic books told a cartoonist that the cartoonist was an employee and that copyright
law did not allow employees to get copyrights in work done for their employers. See id. at 199.
The court refused to grant the publisher's motion for summary judgment because the legally
unsophisticated cartoonist may have had a right to rely on representations of law made by the
more sophisticated publisher. See id. at 201. Moreover, if a fiduciary relationship existed, the
publisher may have been liable for failure to inform the cartoonist about his rights to retain
copyrights in his work. See id. at 199.
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Publications, Inc. suggests that the superficiality of contractual lan-
guage describing artists as employees, which should be obvious to
record companies that use it, is likely to provoke stern treatment by
courts."'
B. Inherent Contradiction in Disclaimers
Many record contracts contain disclaimers denying an em-
ployment or agency relationship between the record company and the
artist; ' these clauses are attempts to avoid respondeat superior tort
liability. However, these clauses contradict the proposition that an
employment relationship exists for work-for-hire purposes. '33 Although
probably without legal effect,"" this contradiction would at least un-
dermine record companies' credibility in arguing that a work-for-hire
copyright exists under the employment prong.3 ' Moreover, treating
artists as independent contractors for other legal purposes may estop
record companies from arguing that artists are employees for work-
for-hire purposes.'
To claim an artist as an employee for some purposes and not
for others constitutes a legal injustice because the record company
reaps the rewards of work-for-hire copyright ownership without pay-
ing employee benefits and withholding taxes.'37 The common law
agency test should be applied consistently across claims,'38 ensuring
that an artist is not considered an employee for some purposes and not
for others.'39
131. See id.
132. One such contract contains a paragraph that states, "6(a) . . . [Artist's recordings are]
prepared within the scope of Company's employment of Artist hereunder." ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY 1995, supra note 16, at 39 para. 6(a). A later paragraph in the same contract states
"[n]othing contained herein shall constitute... either party the agent or employee of the other
(except as set forth in paragraph 6(a)... )." Id. at 50 para. 14(a).
133. 'Moral symmetry" exists if the agency law work-for-hire employer would be liable for
the employee's acts. Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters.,
Inc., 815 F.2d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987).
134. As previously explained, whether an agency relationship exists is an objective question
of common law, which cannot be contractually overridden, see supra note 17 and accompanying
text, regardless of whether the context is tort liability or work-for-hire doctrine, see supra
note 82.
135. See Kreiss, supra note 17, at 173.
136. See id. ("Principles of estoppel might prevent parties from adopting a position in a copy-
right case inconsistent with the position they adopted in a case under a different statute.').
137. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 5.03[A] text accompanying nn.11.6-11.9.
138. See supra note 82.
139. An artist should not be deemed a record company employee and his work should not be
work-for-hire unless the record company withholds income and social security taxes and treats
the artist as an employee for payroll purposes. See Kreiss, supra note 17, at 141. California law
mandates that creators of works-for-hire be treated as employees for unemployment compensa-
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IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY UNDERLYING WORK-FOR-HIRE
AND RIGHT OF TERMINATION
The 1976 copyright legislation was the result of many years of
negotiations and compromises between private interests that Con-
gress directly adopted in drafting the Copyright Act."' The records of
these negotiations are valuable aids to legislative interpretation. 1
A. The Intended Scope of Work-For-Hire Doctrine Does
Not Include Sound Recordings
The course of negotiations indicates that the scope of the work-
for-hire definition, especially the scope of the commissioned works
category, is limited so as not to include sound recordings. The Copy-
right Register first proposed a definition of "work-for-hire" based
solely on the existence of an employment relationship, excluding all
commissioned works.' Opposition from the book publishing and mo-
tion picture industries caused the final definition to include a few
classes of commissioned works.' Book publishers argued that because
they contribute significant creative effort in compiling the works of
freelance authors, Congress should classify the contributions to those
compilations as works-for-hire."' Authors' representatives, however,
advocated a narrow scope of commissioned works, because they feared
that freelance authors lack the bargaining power to resist work-for-
tion and benefits purposes, regardless of the relationship between the parties, even if the works
are specially commissioned. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 594 & n.25. Record companies'
failure to comply with the law may provide a claim for recission of California contracts on the
grounds that they violate public policy. See id. at 599. Recission may allow the artists to reclaim
the copyrights in sound recordings tendered as consideration for the rescinded contracts. See id.
140. "The work-made-for-hire provisions of this bill represent a carefully balanced compro-
mise ... ." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
The right of termination provision "reflects a practical compromise... recognizing the problems
and legitimate needs of all interests involved." Id. at 124. See generally Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (discussing the Copy-
right Act's unusual legislative history, the compromises, and proper methods of interpretation).
141. See Litman, supra note 140, at 879-83 (explaining that Congress acknowledged its lack
of expertise, and therefore opted to supervise negotiations and then adopt compromises reached
by industry representatives). 'Ultimately, to understand the language of the 1976 Act, one must
look to the understanding of the people who agreed on the compromises reflected in the statute."
Id. at 882.
142. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6, supra note 108, at 66; see also Hill, supra note 25,
at 567-71 (assimilating the legislative history regarding the commissioned work categories).
143. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6, supra note 108, at 66-67.
144. See id. at 67. Examples of works that should be works-for-hire were translations, maps,
illustrations and appendices in books, contributions to dictionaries and encyclopedias, and parts
of motion pictures. See id. On the other hand, the parties conceded that many commissioned
works, such as serious music and choreography should not be works-for-hire. See id.
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hire agreements.4 ' Against this backdrop, courts should strictly con-
strue the commissioned work categories as narrow accommodations of
the concerns of the book and motion picture industries.
1 4
1
The relationship between artists and record companies does
not elicit the concerns that motivated Congress to establish the com-
missioned work categories. Unlike record companies, encyclopedia and
textbook publishers contribute significant creative effort by compiling
the works of many authors."4 The level of effort required to compile
sound recordings pales in comparison to that required for textbooks
and encyclopedias, which are compiled by coordinating thousands of
scientists, authors, and artists."8 Unfairness would result to textbook
publishers if all the contributing authors had termination rights be-
cause reuse of their contributions in subsequent editions would re-
quire renegotiation on an infeasible scale.4 9 On the other hand, termi-
nation is not unfair to a record company because a single album
usually contains one or a few artists with whom the company would
have to renegotiate.'" Because Congress intended the commissioned
works prong to accommodate works that require laborious compilation
processes, which add substantial economic value to the compiled
145. See id.
146. "Strict adherence to the language and structure of the Act is particularly appropriate"
because the Act is "a carefully worked out compromise aimed at balancing legitimate interests."
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 748 & n.14 (1989); see Lulirama
Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1997) (strictly construing the
commissioned works categories).
Sound recordings were not recognized as copyrightable subject matter until 1971, several
years after the negotiations regarding categories of commissioned works concluded. See Copy-
rights-Sound Recordings, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(7)
(1994)); Litman, supra note 140, at 867-68 (stating that the work-for-hire compromise adopted in
the 1976 Act had been left unchanged since an initial draft ten years earlier). These circum-
stances negate any theory that the drafters actually contemplated including sound recordings in
the categories of commissioned works. Additionally, the 1971 amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 102,
which established a category of copyrightable subject matter called "sound recordings," did not
add sound recordings to the enumerated categories of commissioned works eligible for work-for-
hire status in 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). See Copyrights-Sound Recordings, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85
Stat. 391 (1971) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(7) (1994)).
147. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION
PART 5: 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 149 (Comm. Print 1964),
reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman ed.,
1976) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5] (implying that a textbook, encyclopedia, or
map publisher might acquire contributions from "seven thousand top specialists in various fields
of science, industry, philosophy and literature).
148. See id. at 149-50.
149. See id. at 150.
150. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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works,15' sound recordings should not be included within the scope of
commissioned works.
B. Congressional Policy Behind the Copyright Act's Right of
Termination Should Inform the Work-For-Hire Determination
Because the most significant right controlled by the work-for-
hire determination is the artist's right to terminate an assigned copy-
right,5' courts should avoid finding a work-for-hire when that decision
would controvert the purpose of the right of termination. Congress
understood that new artists who have little bargaining power give up
many copyrights on disadvantageous terms before the value of those
copyrights becomes ascertainable." Congress intended the right of
termination to give these artists a chance to renegotiate royalties after
their work enters the market and obtains definite value."'
After the 1976 Copyright Act, clauses attempting to contractu-
ally circumvent the right of termination became common, essentially
boilerplate in most record contracts," but these efforts were in vain."
To guarantee protection of artists with little bargaining power,
Congress made the right of termination inalienable so that the future
right could not be assigned at the same time as the initial copyright."7
As work-for-hire is an alternative, although indirect, method of cir-
cumventing the right of termination," record companies include work-
for-hire clauses in their contracts in an attempt to eliminate the art-
ist's right of termination."
151. See Litman, supra note 140, at 890-91; Roundtable Discussion, supra note 10, at 542
(statement of Lois Wasoff of Prentice Hall that book publishers deserve work-for-hire copyright
ownership because the compilation process is what creates the "economic value" of the work).
152. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 5.03[A].
153. The right of termination provision was "needed because of the unequal bargaining posi-
tion of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has
been exploited." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5740; see also sources cited supra note 7.
154. See supra note 8.
155. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 593-94; see, e.g., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 1995, supra
note 16, at 38-39 para. 6(a) (sample recording agreement stating that the "[c]ompany is and shall
be the exclusive owner in perpetuity throughout the universe... of all right, title and interest in
and to all Video Songs, Masters and other recordings"); see generally 3 NIMMER, supra note 17,
§ 11.07.
156. The termination provisions of the Copyright Act provide that "[tiermination may be af-
fected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or
to make any future grant." 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5) (1994).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
158. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 11.02[A][2].
159. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 592; Roundtable Discussion, supra note 10, at 526
(statement of Charles Sanders, representative of the National Music Publishers Association).
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Courts should allow work-for-hire doctrine to circumvent the
right of termination only when the doctrine does not defeat congres-
sional policy behind the right of termination. Work-for-hire doctrine is
aligned with right of termination policy in two situations. First, if the
artist is an employee under § 101(1), and the company treats the artist
as an employee for payroll purposes, then the company deserves full-
term copyright ownership." Second, if the artist is an independent
contractor creating a commissioned work under § 101(2), and the
commissioner adds significant economic value by a laborious compila-
tion process, the artist's forfeiture of his termination rights is consis-
tent with right of termination policy.1"' Neither of these situations
describes the typical company/artist situation. Accordingly, a record
company's work-for-hire ownership of sound recording copyrights
violates congressional policy behind the right of termination.
V. CONCLUSION
Several copyright scholars and prominent entertainment at-
torneys doubt the enforceability of work-for-hire clauses in record
contracts and expect that some artists will bring lawsuits against
record companies in 2013." While only wildly popular artists' sound
recordings will have any value thirty-five years after release,'" many
recordings continue earning royalties over an extended period of time.
The recordings of Elvis Presley, Ray Charles, Frank Sinatra, Perry
Como, Bob Dylan, Pink Floyd, The Rolling Stones, Aretha Franklin,
Hank Williams, and Patsy Cline are about thirty-five years old, yet
remain popular with record buyers. In addition, licensing old record-
ings for use in movie and television soundtracks produces significant
160. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. "If you establish a true employee rela-
tionship where the [hired party] is actually working as an employee within the scope of employ-
ment, then there is really no question of who the rights initially belong to." Roundtable Discus-
sion, supra note 10, at 530 (statement of Irwin Karp, discussion moderator); see Anderson, supra
note 1, at 594-601 (explaining that California law and public policy require hiring parties to
provide employment benefits when claiming ownership of a person's works as works-for-hire
under either the employment or commissioned works prong of the work-for-hire doctrine in
§ 101).
161. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
162. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 13; Anderson, supra note 1, at 599-600;
Roundtable Discussion, supra note 10, at 527 (statement of Charles Sanders, representative of
the National Music Publishers Association); Mike Milom, Esq., Legal Problems in the Music
Industry, seminar conducted at Vanderbilt University School of Law (Jan. 28, 1999) (notes on file
with author) (anticipating litigation in 2013). For a practicioner's perspective, see generally
Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 43.
163. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 10, at 509.
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revenue. The Kingsmen's "Louie, Louie," Steppenwolf's "Born to be
Wild," and "Green Onion" by Booker T and the MGs, for example, are
heavily licensed for use in movies, television shows and commercials.'"
Prominent recordings created after January 1, 1978, by artists such as
Billy Joel, Jimmy Buffet, James Taylor, The Eagles, Led Zeppelin, The
Beach Boys, and Willie Nelson, will likely generate enough demand
after 2013 to make copyright litigation worthwhile.
The argument that artists' works are not works-for-hire is
strongly supported by legal doctrine, and the legislative policy under-
lying the right of termination forcefully supports the legal argument.
Congress designed the right of termination to guarantee artists an
opportunity to renegotiate their share of the profits that their art
generates, regardless of the terms on which they initially parted with
that art. Because work-for-hire doctrine eliminates this supposedly
inalienable second negotiation, a direct tension exists between work-
for-hire doctrine and the right of termination. Work-for-hire clauses in
recording contracts circumvent the artist's right of termination with-
out the reciprocal sacrifices by the record company that congressional
policy demands." The forfeiture of termination rights as a result of
work-for-hire doctrine contravenes congressional policy in the com-
pany/artist context because record companies do not treat artists as
employees for payroll purposes ' and do not add significant economic
value to the artists' works by laborious compilation processes. 7
Obviously favoring record companies are their wealth and re-
sources for defending litigation. Threatened loss of copyrights in many
valuable recordings in year 2013 and each year thereafter is a com-
pelling reason to fight for favorable legal precedent, but artists likely
to seek termination will have several practical advantages over record
companies. Litigation will not be cost prohibitive if groups of artists
share the costs by bringing class actions against their record compa-
nies." Perhaps competing record companies or other interested par-
ties would lend support in exchange for some rights in the reclaimed
164. Interview with Mark Dougall, Esq., in Nashville, Tenn. (Feb. 28, 1999).
165. According to Professor Nimmer, a purchaser of rights "may not exert greater bargaining
power so as to require the author to agree to surrender his or her future right of termination," 3
NIMMER, supra note 17, § 11.07, yet this is precisely the result of work-for-hire in the com-
pany/artist relationship. See supra Part IV.B. The Roundtable participants acknowledge the
importance of true bargaining in an agreement making a commissioned work a work-for-hire.
See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 10, at 529-31, 541, 544, 545-46, 553-54; see also Marci A.
Hamilton, Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright
Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1306-11 (1987).
166. See supra Part IV.B.
167. See supra Part IV.B.
168. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 599-600.
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copyrights.'" Moreover, recording artists can easily arouse sympathy
for their cause because record companies have historically treated
them unfairly.
170
Even if artists can reclaim their copyrights, success would be
hollow unless artists could continue selling records.17' Ownership of
copyrights gives artists no right to the physical master tapes of their
original recordings.Y12 Fortunately for artists, however, if record com-
panies refuse to sell them the masters, artists can mass-produce re-
cordings from ordinary compact discs, which maintain near perfect
fidelity to the original masters.'
Another impediment to exploitation of a reclaimed copyright is
the fact that the scope of the reclaimed copyright only covers the right
to reproduce the artist's own contributions to the recording; in many
instances that may be only the lead vocal parts of the recording." The
record companies would likely continue to hold the copyrights in the
performances by side musicians and producers' contributions. Of
course, the artists who reclaim the copyrights in their works could
prevent the record companies from exploiting their vocals, which
would make the recordings effectively useless to either party. The
parties could break this counter-productive deadlock by negotiating a
price at which one party would sell his rights to the other-precisely
the solution sought by right of termination policy.
Record companies should meet artists at the bargaining table
because the outcome of litigation is potentially unfavorable to the
companies. Renegotiation'75 of record deals is a favorable solution for
169. Of course, these companies would want to make sure they are not potential future de-
fendants on this issue before aiding the plaintiffs side. They might do this by renegotiating all
their own deals before supporting a lawsuit against a competitor.
170. For a classic example of the unfair treatment of artists by record companies, see Patry,
supra note 19, at 664-68.
171. Artists able to reclaim their copyrights might want to enter into a pressing and distribu-
tion agreement with another record company, under which the artist retains full copyright
ownership and pays the record company for manufacture and distribution. See PASSMAN, supra
note 1, at 200; SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 51.
172. 17 U.S.C § 202 (1994). Even if an artist's work is deemed not to be work-for-hire and
copyright ownership can be reclaimed, the artist does not have any right to a physical copy of the
copyrighted work. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 5.03[A] n.12.
173. Digital recording technology ensures that compact disc6 maintain near perfect fidelity to
their masters regardless of the number of copies made. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999).
174. See Mike Milom, Esq., Legal Problems in the Music Industry, seminar conducted at
Vanderbilt University School of Law (Feb. 15, 1999) (notes on file with author).
175. A renegotiation should eliminate the artist's right of termination in order to fully pro-
tect the record company. The artist should exercise his right of termination and then execute
new assignments of his copyrights to the company. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 11.07 text
accompanying nn.11-12 ("[Without] at least a moment when the [artist] is bound under neither
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both sides because litigation would sever a necessary relationship.
Artists need record companies to produce, promote, and distribute
their recordings. Artists would thus prefer to negotiate better deals
with their current record companies than spend the time and re-
sources required to shop around for new record deals. Obviously, a
record company would prefer a smaller share of split profits rather
than an end to a steady stream of income. Additionally, record compa-
nies draw new artists by having high profile artists on their roster,
and a demonstration of loyalty and fairness to retired artists creates
goodwill with the companies' up and coming stars. By renegotiating
with artists, record companies can avoid setting precedent that would
destabilize their way of contracting and threaten their ownership of
valuable sound recording copyrights subject to termination in year
2013 and beyond.
Ryan Ashley Rafoth*
the prior nor the new grant... there is not a new grant, but only a change in the terms of the old
grant.').
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law, Page Kelley I1, Esq., Director of Legal and Business Affairs, Arista Records, Nashville,
Katherine Woods, Esq., Director of Legal and Business Affairs, RCA Label Group, Nashville, and
the Editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review. Most of all I thank my wife, Jennifer, for faithfully
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